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Abstract 
This paper focuses on the role of punishment as a critical social mechanism for cheating 
prevention in MMORPGs. The role of punishment is empirically investigated in a case study of 
the MMORPG Tibia (http://www.tibia.com) and by focusing on the use of bots to cheat. We 
describe the failure of punishment in Tibia, which is perceived by players as one of the elements 
facilitating the proliferation of bots. In this process some players act as a moral enterprising group 
contributing to the reform of the game rules and in particular to the reform of the Tibia punishment 
system by the game company. In the conclusion we consider the ethical issues raised by our 
findings and we propose some general reflections on the role of punishment and social 
mechanisms for the governance of online worlds more generally 
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1. Introduction 
Massively Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Games (MMORPGs) – a specific subset of Online 
Games – are a distinct phenomenon of the Information Society1. MMORPGs are subject to a range 
of problems that affect both the service providers (i.e. game companies) and the players (ENISA
2
, 
2008) and cheating is one of them. In our research we investigate a cheating practice prevalent in 
MMOPRGs: the use of bots, computer programs used to automate the game and whose use is a 
violation of MMORPGs legal documents. The consideration driving our work is that certain forms 
of cheating that are highly detrimental to the game-play and to MMOPRGs as services – like bots 
– cannot be prevented with purely technological security solutions, such as automatic detection 
tools. We propose that social control mechanisms should also be harnessed for preventing 
cheating. 
                                                 
1
  See http://www.mmodata.net for updated statistics about MMOPRGs. 
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  European Network and Information Security Agency. 
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In this paper we argue that punishment is a fundamental social mechanism for cheating prevention 
in MMORPGs. With punishment we mean a penalty or a sanction received for a wrong-doing (e.g. 
a law violation), which is given by society or by a social group to the wrong-doers (e.g. those who 
violate the rules). The End User License Agreement (EULA) and other legal documents of a 
MMORPG (such as the Terms of Service or the Privacy Policies) describe how the player may 
participate in the game. When players act outside the terms of the EULA (or other documents), the 
game company reserves the right to punish players (Alemi, 2007). In MMORPGs, the game 
companies' right to enforce rule violations is based on their dictatorial power over everything in 
the virtual world which is granted to them by games' legal documents (Castronova, 2005). Further, 
EULAs and other legal documents are accepted by all players, in the same form, when they create 
a game account. These documents explain to players that they are entering a game world with 
other people and that they have to control their behaviour or consequences will follow 
(Castronova, 2005). Hence, players might expect to see their peers acting inside these rules and to 
see rules enforced and rule violations punished by game companies when they are severely 
violated. In this paper we propose a theorization of the social mechanism of punishment in relation 
with one of its primary functions: the prevention of wrong-doing. In this way we provide 
recommendations for adopting effective punishments to help prevent cheating in MMORPGs. The 
theorization we propose is based on the outcomes of an in-depth empirical case study of a major 
MMORPG.  
Our investigative approach is multidimensional. Firstly, we selected a relevant case study – the 
MMORPG Tibia (http://www.tibia.com) that was undergoing crucial changes with regards to 
the organization of rules enforcement against cheating. Secondly, for the data collection we 
conducted an ethnography of the virtual world (Nardi, 2010; Hine, 2000). Thirdly, we used an 
inductive approach for analysing the ethnographic data based on Grounded Theory (Charmaz, 
2006). In our bottom-up theory building, and in close relation with our ethnographic method, we 
used the work by Becker (1963) on the Sociology of Deviance and some contributions from the 
Sociology of Punishment such as Cragg (1992), Beccaria (1764) and Foucault (1975). We use the 
conceptualization of punishment by these authors to organize and analyse our data. In particular, 
the seminal and neat work by Beccaria helped us to conceptualise the potential preventive power 
of punishment in MMORPGs, 
3 
The paper is organized as follows: we first describe MMORPGs and cheating (section 2); then we 
present our investigative approach and the case study (section 3-4); we  then present the empirical 
research describing the role of punishment in Tibia (sections 5-7); in the conclusion we consider 
the ethical issues raised by our findings and propose some general reflections on the role of 
punishment and social mechanisms for the governance of online worlds more generally 
 
2. A Short Description of MMORPGs and Cheating 
MMORPGs are both highly sophisticated technological systems (Acterbosch, 2008), as well as 
'deeply social' Virtual Worlds (Taylor, 2006; Bainbridge, 2010; Nardi, 2010) in which millions of 
players interact online through their avatars. Further they are persistent and continue to function 
even after individual players have logged out. Finally, the business model of well known 
MMORPGs like World of Warcraft is based on an initial retail sale plus subscriptions fees (Kerr, 
2006). More recent MMORPGs offer often free accounts and make their money on 
microtransactions (e.g. Allods Online
3
).  
For game players, levelling one‟s avatar is a key task in MMORPGs. An avatar is the persona that 
represents and is controlled by the player inside the game. Levelling an avatar is achieved by 
acquiring and accumulating experience points which are obtained by killing monsters or 
completing game quests. By increasing the level, the avatar will be able to become more powerful 
inside the game. Collecting virtual gold is also important as with it avatars can acquire special 
items such as weapons, gears or in-game commodities. It is important to clarify however that most 
high-end gears in MMORPGs are not always buyable with gold and can be obtained for instance 
by completing game quests. Therefore, collecting virtual gold is an important activity in 
MMORPGs that allows the avatar to buy certain items and commodities, but collecting gold is not 
usually as central as levelling. 
In an MMOPRG there are different forms of rules
4
 that guide the behavior of players. Firstly, we 
have the design rules of the Virtual World that are encoded in the software artifact (Nardi, 2010): 
for example avatars might be allowed to enter buildings not only by using doors, but also to walk 
through walls by drinking a magic potion or casting a spell. Secondly, and most important for us, 
                                                 
3
  http://en.allods.gpotato.eu/  
4
  Castronova (2005) and Nardi (2010) contain extensive discussions of rules in MMORPGs. Readers are invited 
to refer to their books for full discussions of rules in MMORPGs. 
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we have rules which players must agree with before they enter the game world for the first time. 
By clicking on the button “I Agree” or “I Accept” of EULAs, players implicitly agree with the 
rules contained in these documents, even if they did not read them. The acceptance/agreement with 
these legal documents is mandatory for players, in order to play the game. These rules usually 
include: the game EULA - protecting the software client, the Terms of Service (ToS) protecting 
the software running on the server and game rules describing the main forms of rule violations. 
 
 
Cheating is a key problem affecting MMORPGs and Online Gaming more generally (ENISA, 
2008), insofar as it is perceived by the developers, publishers, and many players to be a threat to 
the social experience and economic viability of a game
5
.  
Elsewhere we showed the limits of current mainstream definitions of cheating in MMORPGs and 
digital games in general (AUTHORS, 2010a) understood as the set of activities that brings the 
player/cheater an unfair advantage over other players (see Yan and Randell, 2005; Salen and 
Zimmerman, 2004; Smith, 2004). Cheating, according to standard typologies (Yan and Choi, 
2002), includes a variety of activities such as the exploitation of game bugs, the manipulation of 
other player‟s trust or the use of software to manipulate the game code. In our view, mainstream 
definitions of cheating tend to focus almost exclusively on what gives players unfair advantages 
(e.g. a bug exploitation, a design weakness, the manipulation of game code), whereas everything 
else related with cheating remains largely unstudied. In contrast we argue for a definition of 
cheating as the inter-relation of a number of MMOPRGs elements that in themselves do not 
necessarily bring unfair advantages to cheaters (AUTHORS, 2010a)
6
, including: technologies 
(game code and infrastructure), legal documents, game play and also the enforcement of rules 
against cheating. Our working definition of cheating purposefully avoids any a-priori judgment 
(Latour, 1988) that cheating in MMORPGs is either good or evil. In this way we implicitly agree 
with the methodological principle of avoiding imposing a predetermined grid of analysis onto our 
data (Callon, 1986). In particular, our working definition of cheating allows us to avoid deciding 
beforehand that cheating is something detrimental to the gameplay or something that provides 
                                                 
5
  In our literature review on cheating we consider only contributions related with digital and online games, in 
order to narrow the focus of the review and concentrate our effort on the digital aspects of cheating. We purposefully avoid 
to discuss contributions addressing cheating “offline”, as for instance in DeKoven (1978). 
6
  This view shares some concepts with Kücklich (2007 and 2009). 
5 
cheaters with unfair advantages, which is something implicitly contained in traditional definitions 
of cheating in digital games. Our working definition of cheating instead allows us to study the 
enforcement of cheating rules, something which has rarely been studied so far
7
 from an empirical 
point of view, given that this issue (i.e. the enforcement) falls outside the traditional definition of 
cheating as the actions that give players unfair advantages.  
 
On another occasion (AUTHORS, 2010b) we showed that technical literature sees cheating mainly 
as a technological flaw or weakness in game information security (Yan and Randell, 2005; Di 
Chen and Maheswaran, 2004; Ferretti and Rocetti, 2006; Smed and Hakkonen, 2006), with hence 
a technological bias. We also showed that media literature on cheating focuses mostly on cultural 
aspects
8
, emphasizing players resistance to design choices (Consalvo, 2007; Kücklich, 2007), 
cheating as a learning process (Fields and Kafai, 2009) or motivations or intentions to cheat 
(Smith, 2004; Consalvo, 2007). Our approach attempts instead to keep together – in a seamless 
web – both cultural and technical aspects, following a well established tradition in Science and 
Technology Studies (Latour, 2005; Bijker, 1995; MacKenzie and Waijcman, 1999). Our approach 
purposefully avoids any a priori reduction of cheating in MMORPGs to either the technical or the 
social. 
 
3. Theorising Punishment 
In this paper we theorize about the role of punishment in the prevention of game rules violations. 
The concepts proposed by Becker (1963) in his book Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of 
Deviance constitute the scaffold of our theory. For Becker (1963, p. 59) deviance is: “a breakdown 
in social controls which ordinarily operate to maintain the valued forms of behaviour”. Deviance 
is the violation of socially established formal and informal rules and norms. 
In our research we focus on a specific rule violation in MMORPGs, the use of bots: software 
programs that use Artificial Intelligence routines, tailored specifically for the game, to automate 
the gameplay. Botting
9
 and using macros for automating the game is a violation of MMOPRGs 
                                                 
7
  Chapter 6 of Consalvo (2007) is an exception which contains a discussion of the anti-cheating industry and the 
development of anti-cheating tools. 
8
  This view has recently been criticized also by Withson (2010). 
9
  With botting we refer to the act of using a bot. Later in the paper we use the term botter to refer to the user of a 
bot. These terms follows those used by Tibia players in their discussions. 
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legal documents
10
. For example in World of Warcraft (WoW) – the most successful and now 
prototypical MMORPG – using a bot to tamper with the game client is a violation of term 2B of 
the EULA (Blizzard, 2010). In Tibia – our case study – using a bot is a violation of rule 3c 
(Cipsoft, 2009b), which states that it is forbidden to manipulate the game client or use additional 
software to play. Using a bot is a breakdown of social control and a violation of the rules that 
players accept when they create a game account.  
Becker argues that any serious study of deviance should account not only for the rules violation 
but also for the “actions of enforcement of such rules and norms” (Becker, 1963, p. 1): 
 
All social groups make rules and attempt, at some time and under some circumstances, to enforce 
them. Social rules define situations and the kinds of behavior appropriate to them, specifying some 
actions as "right" and forbidding others as "wrong”.  
 
We maintain that studying rules enforcement against cheating in MMOPRGs is therefore as 
important as studying cheating as a rule breaking action. Playing without the aid of external 
software is a behavior that conforms with the rules of MMORPGs, whereas using a bot is a 
violation of such rules. Further, rules are enforced by the enforcing authority. In MMORPGs, 
game companies are the enforcement authorities and the material act of enforcement is often 
delegated to Gamemasters
11
 or sometimes to automatic detection tools (Consalvo, 2007).  
For Becker (1963, p. 122) rule enforcement is an enterprising act with someone taking the 
initiative to create and enforce rules: 
 
First, enforcement of a rule is an enterprising act. Someone - an entrepreneur - must take the 
initiative in punishing the culprit. 
 
In some parts of his book Becker calls this the Moral Enterprise. Becker explains that (1963, p. 
145): 
 
                                                 
10
  Some MMORPGs may tolerate the use of macros and bots, but this is more the exception than the rule. (see 
Wikipedia Contributors 2010, MMORPGs, bots). 
11
  Gamemasters are people (often employees of the game companies) that act as moderator or enforcer of the 
game rules. 
7 
Wherever rules are created and applied, we should be alive to the possible presence of an 
enterprising individual or group. Their activities can properly be called moral enterprise, for what 
they are enterprising about is the creation of a new fragment of the moral constitution of society, 
its code of right and wrong. 
 
The moral enterprise is therefore an entity (an individual or collective actor) that creates fragments 
of the moral constitution of society: it creates codes of conduct that are meant to be followed by 
people. Game companies, even if their focus is on business and profit, have also this role of moral 
enterprising as they, with legal documents, create public rules that should be followed by players 
and they define what is right and wrong inside the game.  
 
 
Punishment is a crucial aspect of the moral enterprises attempt to ensure that shared rules are 
followed by members of a group (Cragg, 1992). Taking inspiration from Foucault (1975) we 
understand punishment as a situated phenomenon which involves both negative aspects that 
repress, or exclude, but also positive effects. According to Beccaria (1764, Ch. 01), punishment is 
a mechanism that society uses to defend public spaces – generated by the social contract – from 
the usurpation of individuals. Punishments inflicted for the violation of the social contract are 
accepted by people with the acceptance of the social contract in itself (Rousseau, 1762). Even if an 
MMORPG EULA cannot be considered as a social contract the dynamics in place are similar to 
those just described: when players click on buttons such as “”I accept” or “I Agree” of MMORPGs 
legal documents – even without reading their content – they also implicitly accept the punishments 
set by the game companies for the rules violations. This happens even if players do not know what 
these punishments are.  
Punishment possesses an important social function: it allows the prevention of wrong-doing 
against society and social groups: 
 
The end of punishment, therefore, is no other than to prevent the criminal from doing further 
injury to society, and to prevent others from committing the like offence. (Beccaria, Ch 12) 
 
8 
This preventive power is why we think punishment should be part of our design of new socio-
technical solutions against cheating as rule violation in MMORPGs: acting preventively is better 
than punishing afterwards (Beccaria, 1764), when damage has been inflicted on society. 
We found it useful in our analysis of the Tibia punishment controversy to use the classical 
distinction between retributive and forward looking punishments (Cragg, 1992; Bedau and Kelly, 
2010). 
Retributive punishment can be characterized as follows (Cragg, 1992, p. 15): 
1) it is backward-looking. It justifies punishment as a response to a past event; 
2) it justifies punishment as a response to an injustice; 
3) the offender gains an advantage which he/she does not merit. Punishment removes the 
undeserved benefit by imposing a penalty to the offender, which restores the social 
equilibrium
12
. To some extent, punishment  balances the harm inflicted by the offence to 
society. 
On the contrary forward looking punishments (Cragg, 1992, p. 31-33): 
1) require that punishment be evaluated by reference to the welfare of offenders, victims, and 
the public at large; 
2) seek to influence the behaviour of people through the use of rewards and punishments; 
3) should not be inflicted except where some good will come of it.  
 
At a general level, reward and punishment systems are a defining game mechanic of the design of 
any digital game (Salen and Zimmerman, 2004). In a digital game, basic in-game actions (such as 
shooting or jumping) are regulated by internal game mechanics. Killing a monster or completing a 
quest are actions rewarded, for example, with special items. Likewise being killed by a monster or 
falling down from a platform might result in a punishment such as a decrease in an avatar‟s level. 
According to Morrison (2009) “Punishment and Reward Systems nudge the player towards certain 
behavior.  They give meaning and weight to the Base Mechanics, forcing the player to think about 
their choices”13. A game's punishment system has the power to make the players reflect on the 
consequences of their actions and to shape the game experience and player's game actions (Salen 
and Zimmerman, 2004). Reward and punishment are constraining aspects of the game design, able 
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  This principle is called the Balance of Justice Standard. 
13
  Here the author refers mainly to in-game actions. 
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to direct players toward what is right and what is wrong in a game (Sicart, 2009; Johansson, 2009). 
It is the already central position of punishment in game design that makes this social mechanism a 
good candidate for preventing cheating in MMORPGs. 
 
4. The Case Study of Tibia 
Our investigation is based on an in-depth case study of the MMORPG Tibia 
(http://www.tibia.com), developed and published by the independent company Cipsoft. The 
game has an estimated player base of 300,000 and around 1.3 million accounts. To create an 
account in Tibia is free, but players can pay a subscription fee for a premium account and receive 
additional services, for example more areas of the game to enjoy or special quests. A single Tibia 
account allows the player to create multiple characters/avatars belonging to that account. 
Tibia was selected as case study because an intense anti-cheating strategy was deployed by Cipsoft  
and on the 5
th
 of January 2009 Cipsoft (2009a) published an article entitled “Where Will Cheaters 
Go From Here”, which described from our point of view a new moral enterprising strategy against 
the use of bots.  
Tibia, like others MMORPGs, has in recent years being affected by the diffusion of bots (see 
discussions in Hoglund and McGraw, 2008; Consalvo 2009). Common bots in Tibia automate the 
game so that the bot can play in place of the player. The bot – among other things – does the most 
common leveling actions which includes controlling the avatar in: moving around on the game 
map, targeting and killing monsters and looting them. In this way the bot allows a faster leveling 
of the avatar and extensive virtual gold gathering when compared to purely “manual” play. Using 
a bot in MMOPRGs is a form of cheating and a rule violation. 
Our claim that Cipsoft is „the moral enterprise‟ of Tibia is justified by the company policy, 
described in the Tibia Manual, Section 6 Rule Enforcement, which states: 
 
Tibia, just like the real world, needs laws and rules which clearly show what is allowed and what 
is not. These rules are called the Tibia Rules. We expect our players to respect and to follow the 
rules at all times so that a minimum level of fairness is maintained in the community. 
 
10 
Cipsoft sets rules with the purpose to clearly define what is allowed (what is right) and what is not 
allowed (what is wrong) in Tibia. Cipsoft is first an economic enterprise focused on maximizing 
profit, and the game rules defining what is allowed in Tibia attempt to generate a fair game service 
for all customers. However, Tibia rules create also what, following Becker we can call a fragment 
of the moral constitution of the MMORPG: Tibia rules attempt to create norms that guide the 
actions of players inside the game, otherwise no fairness can be maintained by the company inside 
the Tibia community. Cipsoft is therefore both an economic and a moral enterprise and defines, in 
the Tibia Manual (Cipsoft, 2010), these rules as a code of conduct that must be followed by 
players. Using a bot can be conceptualized as a deviant act (according to Becker definition) – 
something against the social norm set by the company – as it is a direct violation of Rule 3c of the 
Tibia‟s code of conduct.  
One of the tasks for a moral enterprise is the enforcement of rules. The launch of the new anti-
cheating campaign in January 2009 marked a new enterprising act against the use of bots. This 
campaign involved the introduction of an automatic tool for bot detection and several mass bans of 
cheating accounts
14
. 
Cipsoft as a moral enterprise has of course its own attitude toward punishment which is 
intertwined with the business of developing an MMORPG. Cheaters are also customers and the 
company has a sort of “redemption” attitude toward them (Cipsoft, 2009a): 
 
Let this be the last warning to all cheaters. We do not want you here. The stage is open and we are 
on:  
It's your choice where you go from here.  
Go the wrong way and we'll be there! 
Or come clean while you still can 
and you may avoid getting a ban. 
Take your pick 
but take it quick... 
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  With a ban of more than 100,000 accounts in total and the deletion of 3500 of them. These statistics on deletion 
were updated by Cipsoft until December 2009 (from 
http://www.tibia.com/news/?subtopic=latestnews&id=1148). Official stats on mass bans are also updated 
until December 2009 and the number was about 50,000. However further mass-bans have followed during 2010, bringing 
the number of banned accounts certainly above 100,000. 
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The anti-cheating campaign was announced as a last warning for cheaters with an invitation to 
embrace the “right way”. In the statement above we see that Cipsoft has an interest in making all 
players play fairly rather than deleting cheaters. The problem of revenue is crucial here as the 
company has a medium-long term plan in which Tibia should become clean from bots and this 
plan is based on the redemption (come clean while you can) of cheaters. 
 
In this paper we recount some relevant events from the Tibia anti-cheating campaign which 
occurred during our fieldwork. Our research was not designed to answer a structured research 
question. Rather, we used an inductive-qualitative approach focused on building a theory as 
outcome of the research.  
We collected data from January 2009 till June 2010 from a number of sources, but mainly from the 
Tibia Forums
15
 (1485 forum pages composed of 20 posts each)
16
 all related with the new Cipsoft 
anti-cheating strategy, and from both prior to and after the launch of the campaign. The data 
collection also included game documents including the Tibia game license, the game rules, the 
game manual and a number of articles written by Cipsoft prior and during the anti-cheating 
campaign. Our research also involved playing the game – as a form of participant observation – 
for a number of hours (at least 6 hours a week for the first 6 months of investigation) with two 
different characters/avatars. Our goal in playing the game was to understand and master the 
mechanics, rules and vocabulary of the game in order to follow the players discussion on the 
forums. 
We reconstructed the events of the Tibia anti-cheating campaign based largely on the discussions 
taking place in the game forums which we followed using ethnographic techniques. While not all 
the Tibia players took part to the discussions, the Tibia forums were quite busy during the period 
of our investigation with several intense discussions – some lasting for months with hundreds of 
messages – about the Cipsoft anti-cheating strategy. Several direct communications and 
discussions on the topic also took place between players and company representatives. Although, 
we cannot make generalizations for the whole player community, we are confident that our data 
captures the players contributions and influence on changes in game rules and on the Tibia 
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  Tibia Community Forums URL http://forum.tibia.com/forum/?subtopic=communityboards . The 
forum excerpts we present in the paper can be retrieved – if not deleted by Cipsoft, which systematically removes closed 
threads – using the post-number provided after each quotation. 
16
  Data collection and analysis follows the Association of Internet Researcher Ethical Guidelines (Ess and AoIR, 
2001). 
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punishment system. It is the moral enterprising process coming from players discussing cheating 
and punishment on the forums that we account for in this work. 
All the data collected was analysed using a Grounded Theory (GT) approach (Charmaz, 2006; 
Strauss and Corbin, 1998) in which theory is built via a set of recursive relationships between the 
data (thorough coding) and the concepts composing the theory. GT allows the creation of social 
theory (by an articulation of the concepts) in an inductive way and starting from empirical data. 
 
5. The Failure of Punishment 
We begin the empirical part of the paper by introducing a concept that we define as the failure of 
punishment. Beccaria (1764, Ch. 27) argues: 
 
That a punishment may produce the effect required, it is sufficient that the evil it occasions should 
exceed the good expected from the crime, including in the calculation the certainty of the 
punishment, and the privation of the expected advantage. 
 
In order to produce its desired effects (i.e. preventing further violation of rules and defending the 
public space), the punishment should be sufficient to balance the outcomes of the wrong-doing. 
This should include the removal of the advantages obtained by the wrong-doers. There is therefore 
a sort of calculation or comparison, done often by the authorities and the public, between the 
violation of the rules and the punishment one should receive for violating the rules. But, what 
happens when the punishment is perceived by lay people as being insufficient in comparison to the 
advantages obtained by violating the rules? And what if there is not enough privation of the 
expected advantages? The outcome of this failure of punishment – the situation in which the 
punishment is not sufficient and therefore does not produce the desired effects – is problematic. 
Expanding on Cragg (1992, pp. 114-115) we consider that there are three problems in the failure 
of punishment
17
: 
(1) the victims (of a crime/rule violation) have a growing sense of injustice and 
vulnerability, because the punishment is not able to balance the offence;  
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 We do not consider here the issue of compensation to the victims of crime, as this is an aspect which did not 
emerge clearly from our data. The failure of punishment in our case was not a failure of compensation to individual victims 
for a singular case of offence, as we are analysing the general case of botting in a game. 
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(2) those who violate the rules only obtain benefits from their wrong-doing as punishments 
are too mild in comparison with the offence caused to society;  
(3) there is a loss of confidence in the ability of the moral enterprise to ensure that rules are 
followed. 
 
 
Our examination of the Tibia case study and the failure of punishment will centre around the 
above three issues, with a focus on considering players as the direct victims of cheating as it is 
them who suffer from the disruption of the game balance caused by the proliferation of bots. 
Cheating in an MMORPGs, because it involves necessarily interactions with other players 
(differently from traditional single player games), is also a moral offence toward these other 
players and something that should be remedied when necessary (Kimppa and Bissett, 2005).  
A good starting point  for our discussion is a huge discussion thread
18
 entitled Delete Botters 
launched by a Tibia player (Shelbz
19) on January 2008 on the “Tibia Proposal Forum”, 1 year prior 
to the CipSoft anti-cheating campaign.  
Shelbz, in particular, criticized Cipsoft‟s attitude toward botting and was looking for support from 
the player community for a new strategy against bots. Here is an excerpt from the opening 
message of the thread: 
 
Why should cheaters who ruin the game play, economy of servers, atmosphere and attitudes of all 
players be given anything more? 
The idea of "crippling" botters is worthless. Botters should not be able to continue to use their 
characters in any way shape or form. Tibia as a whole must not devolve any further to 
accommodate cheaters.
20
 
 
This thread starts a public discussion of rule violation (the use of bots) with the claim  that botters 
seriously harm the social space of the game and hence their use should not be tolerated. In this 
situation, argues Shelbz, deletion from the game is what botters deserve. In his book Becker (1963) 
noted that when violations exceed a threshold of tolerance we can expect the public to exercise 
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  See http://forum.tibia.com/forum/?action=thread&threadid=1978162  
19
  Shelbz is the name the player used to post on Tibia forums. 
20
  Posts to the forums contain many errors. We avoided using sic for identifying mistakes and presented them as 
they were. 
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pressure on the moral enterprise (Becker, 1963; Cragg, 1992) for a solution to the problem. Not 
that the violation was ignored by Cipsoft but rather, according to Shelbz, the actual punishment 
was insufficient. At the time of this discussion, the rule enforcement for the whole Tibia (including 
rule 3c) was delegated to a limited number of volunteer gamemasters
21
 who could not deal with 
everything happening over the 70 Tibia servers
22
. Further, the punishment for using a bot in 
violation of Tibia rule 3c, was a temporary account banishment (1 month ban) with a further 
temporary final warning (criminal record) lasting for 6 months and reminding players that any 
further rule violation would lead to a deletion of the account
23
. After the expiration of the warning 
the account becomes fully clean again. To clarify, the key difference between banning and deleting 
an account is that in the first case the player cannot play with her account for a given period of 
time, the account is in fact temporary blocked.  But after the ban period has passed the account 
becomes fully available again. Deletion, instead, means that the account cannot be used anymore 
to play and the account in itself is not anymore available or visible to the player or to the player 
community at large. .  
In any case, the punishment against cheating (1 month ban + temporary criminal record) was seen 
as not enough by Shelbz who launched the Delete Botters thread. Shelbz found support from many 
in the Tibia community
24
  who requested that the punishment system be reformed including an 
instant deletion of those accounts caught using a bot. 
The anti-cheating campaign launched by Cipsoft in January 2009 is an important moral 
enterprising act against bots. However this campaign, for quite some time, focused mostly on 
improving the detection of rules violations (i.e. acting after the violation), especially with the 
introduction of an automatic tool for detecting bots. The existence of an anti-cheating tool was first 
revealed by Cipsoft together with a first mass ban (of about 5000 accounts) at the end of January 
2009. Over Tibia forums players warmly welcomed the new actions that partly restored players‟ 
faith in the ability of Cipsoft to deal with the problem of botting: 
                                                 
21
  Volunteer gamemasters are de facto experienced Tibia players. They are meant to enforce all Tibia rules and 
not just those related with cheating. 
22
  During 2009 and 2010 Cipsoft reformed rule enforcement in various ways, including the Game masters system. 
23
  From Tibia rules 
http://www.tibia.com/gameguides/?subtopic=manual&section=support#ruleenforc
ement  
24
  This thread has reached 250 pages of discussion to date and it is still open, see 
http://forum.tibia.com/forum/?action=thread&threadid=1978162&pagenumber=1  
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Way to go Cipsoft, you bring hope to all the honest players and you finally show that you care 
what happens to Tibia and that you will try to change negative direction it was doomed to end.  
[Character Nienna Telperin, 30/01/2009, Post #22040452] 
 
However, nothing overt was done in terms of punishment by Cipsoft and in fact the sense of 
injustice expressed by Shelbz for the inadequacy of existing punishments was still present on the 
forums until the beginning of 2010 when a reform of punishment took place (see section 7). 
 
5.1 Growing sense of injustice about inadequate punishment 
One of the elements giving birth to a sense of injustice and vulnerability related with the failure of 
punishment is the consideration that fair players are disadvantaged compared to botters in playing 
the game. Based on our analysis of forums we observed a strong perception from players posting 
in these forums that those who violate the rules have, in the end, more advantages compared to 
those who behave according to the rules. For players, current punishment (1 month ban + 6 months 
warning) does not seem to be proportional to the unfair advantages obtained by cheaters. For a 
number of players posting on forums, in other words, there were definitely more advantages to be 
a botter, rather than being a fair player, as the following analogies with the real world well 
explains: 
 
So after 30 days, these "players" will be allowed to come back and have everything they DIDN'T 
work for still be there for them? Do you see people who steal things or cheat for things irl
25
 (and 
get caught and punished for it) still be able to keep any of what they stole or cheated for?.. 
Absolutely not! 
[Character Sinzar, 14/01/2009, Post #21849387] 
 
This is like someone robbing a bank and getting a few million dollars, then he has to go to jail for 
a month and when he's out he gets to keep the money. What kind of nonsense is that? 
[Character Despen, 23/01/2010Post #26294884] 
                                                 
25
  Irl – in real life. 
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After a ban of 30 days those who have violated the rules come back keeping what they have 
unfairly obtained, such as levels and gold. As we can see the idea that fair players are 
disadvantaged is clearly linked with the proportionality of punishment. The actual punishment (30 
days ban) is considered too lenient to balance the unfair advantages obtained by using bots: 
 
it's also absolutely evident that unless botters lose what they get cheating they will continue to do 
so. I can't beleive that you haven't take the decision yet to harden cheaters punishment like losing 
levels/Skills, permanent criminal records etc. 
[Character Akua Knight Of Dark Elf, 18/02/2009, Post #22243229] 
 
The actual punishment does not affect the unfairly obtained advantages. There is not, to use 
Beccaria own words, any “privation of the expected advantages” and hence one of the elements of 
a successful preventive punishment is not fulfilled by current Tibia punishment. There is, in this 
way, a problem of competition: levels, skills and gold unfairly obtained remain with the character 
after the punishment has been carried out. It is therefore not a surprise that fair players posting on 
forums feel a sense of injustice, because of the failure of current punishment.  
 
In brief, the social mechanism of punishment whose goal is to restore the imbalance committed by 
wrong-doers toward „society‟, as well as facilitate the prevention of wrong-doing, here is not 
effective for preventing cheating. 
There is a downside related with the failure of punishment in Tibia: wrong-doers are not afraid of 
being punished for their actions. This is at least the perception expressed on forums by fair 
players: 
 
Cheaters are not afraid at all and i have to watch them day by day all month long hoping that 
mass ban maybe catch one of them. They even did not lose money and exp they got in unfair way.  
[Character Eriea, 25/05/2009, Post #23545396] 
 
We see how a sense of injustice increases with the players witnessing that botters are not punished: 
cheaters are seen as acting with impunity. 
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Given that being a botter is perceived to be a great advantage and that the punishment seems to be 
mild compared to the offence, fair players might feel compelled to turn themselves into botters. 
This feeling is acknowledged by CipSoft (2009a): 
 
Finally, the motivation of many cheaters is to oppress other players which ultimately leads to more 
fair players leaving Tibia and more cheaters coming and even worsening the situation. This also 
includes those players who are fair in their heart but who feel that their only chance to keep up 
with the cheaters is to start cheating themselves. 
 
In order to keep up with cheaters, fair players feel that becoming cheaters is a viable option. The 
failure of punishment brings about this paradoxical situation, which is often expressed on forums:  
 
Most people turn to bots because they have no choice. The advantages of botting are so high. Legit 
people can't keep up with botters. They are left behind. FAR behind... So they turn to bots just 
purely because they need to keep up with the other botters. 
[Character Yuki Zou, 23/10/2008, Post #20911261] 
 
In conclusion, the failure of punishment means that even fair players are pushed to violate rules in 
order to survive and compete within the game. 
 
5.2 Loss of confidence in the Moral Enterprise 
The failure of punishment leads to a further consequence for players: a loss of confidence in the 
ability of the company to fulfill its role as moral enterprise: 
 
When the punishments are only 30 days I feel I have been abandoned by CIP
26
 and that they are 
more concerned with their bot accounts being happy. 
[Character Sir Duckie, 06/05/2009 Post #23295784] 
 
                                                 
26
  CIP stand for Cipsoft 
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When punishments are not effective in counteracting wrong-doing, then rule violation becomes an 
accepted behaviour. This is common, as noticed by Cragg (1992), in those situations in which rule 
violations are not pursued and punished enough. There are however understandable reasons why 
Cipsoft is acting softly toward botters: 
 
Well, i agree with the thread, but i dont think CipSoft will do anything against botters since they 
are the ones that buy premium accounts every time so they are the better customers. 
[Character Sir Baldek, 25/07/2008, Post #19719626] 
 
According to players  posting on the forums botters pay for premium accounts. Thus it is difficult 
to see an action such as the instant account deletion happening, as this will mean revenue losses 
for the company. Players seem to understand that Cipsoft is first and foremost a business 
enterprise, rather than a moral enterprise, focused on maximizing profit: 
 
I do agree that botters should be punished, but I see where CIP is coming from and not deleting 
botters outright. It's because botters, like many Tibians, PAY to play the game. 
[Character Sikky, 21/05/2009, Post #23489827] 
 
There is a difficult balance to keep for the company between erasing paying customers who 
seriously violate the rules and pleasing those who behave according to the rules. The economic 
side of the problem can however be seen differently according to players posting on the forums, 
and the company business dilemma (deleting cheaters or pleasing fair players?) can find a good 
solution with a tough attitude toward cheating: 
 
Well CIP have  2 choices. They can try to stop the botting problem or let it continue to get worse. 
Letting the problem get worse will also have detrimental affects to CIP's bank balance because 
people, like me, get fed up of playing a game alongside AI's and abusive people and stop playing. 
By fighting the botters, sure CIP will lose some customers who cannot bot any longer, but the 
game will become cleaner and more attractive to new customers, and returning old customers. The 
loss of cheating players who create a negative atmosphere in Tibia can't be a bad thing in the long 
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run, and I honestly feel that the botting over the last years has slowed the growth of Tibia quite 
significantly in terms of customer growth. 
[Character Zaniah, 12/01/2009, Post #21831916] 
 
In the long run, says this player, acting toward cheating will have positive effects on the 
company‟s revenue, entirely based on fair players premium accounts. Cipsoft moral enterprising 
actions and business interests can therefore go together. 
 
6. Players as Moral Entrepreneurs  
Tibia players posting on forums did not just observe passively the failure of punishment. They 
have also been actively trying to encourage reform of the punishment system. This is a major 
bottom-up contribution in which a number of players are actively trying to shape game rules and 
their enforcement. In other words, players are here acting as moral entrepreneurs for the game: 
players act as pressure group promoting reforms in the punishment system that will bring positive 
results against cheating. 
The proposed reforms vary in their nature and some even clash with the company‟s business 
strategy. In order to present some of the players‟ proposals for reforms we use the distinction 
between retributive and forward looking punishment.  
 
6.1 Retributive Punishment: Never Give a Second Chance to Botters 
Retributive punishment is backward-looking focusing on past events, with the goal to balance the 
injustice. There is a sort of vengeance in retributive punishments and this includes making 
examples of rule violators, so that others will not commit the same rule violation again. 
The most common retributive punishments proposed by players on the Tibia forums is account 
deletion. We already said that players consider the current punishment (1 month ban + 6 months 
deletion warning) not sufficient to restore the offence and to prevent the rule violation from being 
committed again. Instant deletion of a cheating/botting account is seen by players as the best 
deterrent for discouraging cheating, as Shelbz wrote in the opening message on the aforementioned 
thread:  
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Delete their entire account, regardless of criminal history. No second chances. No refund. 
[Character Shelbz, 09/01/2009, Post #17261396] 
 
Deletion of the whole account (and not just of the cheating character
27
) is indeed regarded as the 
most extreme of all punishment for botters in Tibia. Deletion is a retributive punishment as there is 
no focus on the possible redemption of the offenders, simply wrong-doers are  eliminated once and 
for all from the game. Many posters consider that deletion will allow Cipsoft to prevent the 
proliferation of bots by making examples, another retributive aspect, as the following message 
explains: 
 
I have thought the same thing for a long time with deleting botters, giving them a month ban is no 
better than a slap on the wrist and they go right back at it when the ban is over. Botters need to be 
deleted to show people what happens when they break the rules! 
[Character Landroff, 14/05/2008, Post #18746059] 
 
Account deletion will therefore have preventive power and restore the function of the social 
mechanism of punishment against the proliferation of bots: 
 
The instant deletion of an account is a big enough setback that will discourage cheaters from 
trying again. 
[Character Herun the Undead, 07/01/2009, Post #21775495] 
 
It is important to understand that the current punishment is not only considered too mild, but also 
something that gives botters more than one chance to get away with their wrong doing. Botters 
will be banned for 1 month, but after this period they are allowed to keep what they unfairly 
obtained. Asking for a direct deletion of the whole account implies instead not giving cheaters any 
second chance and denying any form of forgiveness: 
 
                                                 
27
  A single Tibia account allows the creation of multiple characters. 
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Fully endorsing this, we should have harsher punishment on botters and like someone said - to 
those arguing a "second chance" well that second chance can be making a new account as a clean 
player. 
[Character Nienna Telperin, 15/01/2008, Post #17326245] 
 
So, it seems that for Tibia players commenting on the forums a strong retributive punishment will 
allow the company to restore its position as moral enterprise within the community and ensure 
proper game governance. 
A further problem is that game rules are accepted by players when they created their account. 
Violation of the legal documents is violation of shared rules, and hence an offence toward the 
social group: 
 
But we all accepted the CipSoft rules when we created our accounts. We accepted to follow them, 
many players among us is breaking those rules, and what kinda punishment are they getting? A 
single month banishment. This thread is so correct, breaking the rules = you're gone.  
[Character Athanel, 28/02/2008, Post #17805665] 
 
We see that for this player serious rules violation (i.e. botting) should lead to the deletion of the 
account (breaking the rules=you’re gone). The punishment is considered too lenient for the type 
of violation, whereas breaking legal documents should lead to important consequences. 
 
Another requested retributive punishment is to take away the advantages unfairly obtained, in 
particular levels, skills and gold. We already discussed this. Again, this form of punishment is 
backward looking, because it affects the wrong-doing in itself: 
 
When a botter gets caught, his experience points and skills should be greatly reduced. That would 
negate the benefits of taking the risk to cheat. 
[Character Shelbz, 02/02/2009, Post #2206153] 
 
We clearly see how this type of punishment (the reduction of unfair advantages) on the one hand is 
directed toward past achievements with a focus on balancing the offence. On the other side this 
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punishment clearly aims to deter botters, given that they will receive a punishment which may 
prevent the wrong doing from being committed again. 
 
6.2 Forward Looking Punishments 
Instant deletion of botters accounts, as a punishment, rests on the principle that botters do not 
deserve a second chance, because of the violation to the legal documents. This punishment is, 
however, considered sometimes too harsh even for those who have committed the “crime” of 
botting
28
. Indeed, many in the Tibia community advocate a forward looking attitude and the 
opportunity to forgive cheaters when they display some will to redeem themselves. Often this 
second chance is related with a deletion, not of the whole account, but just of the cheating 
character: 
 
Delete the botted character, bann  the account but give them a second chance. I would like to see 
those who do realise the wrong of what they did be able to play again, play fairly and without 
cheats. 
[Character Spike Narooc, 12/03/2008, Post #17962662] 
 
Moreover people make mistakes, by being caught botting once, they may decide to stop and realise 
it is not worth it, however it can be argued that they can have this new chance on a new account 
[Character Heiti Oblivion, 17/04/2008, Post #18422677] 
 
As we can see in the above messages giving a second chance to botter is clearly a forward looking 
attitude, with players (at least those posting on forums) willing to trust that cheaters can redeem 
themselves and behave according to the legal documents. In addition we find an aversion to harsh 
punishments such as a reduction of levels. What follows is an answer to a proposal promoting a 
great reduction of experience, skills and gold of cheaters: 
 
With all due respect I like this idea [of taking away levels and gold] , but I simply think it's too 
harsh. Sure people have botted but they still should be given a second chance.  
                                                 
28
  Crime could be too strong a word for botting. However, often players themselves make analogies between 
botting and real world crimes such as bank robberies. We use this word consistently in the empirical part of this paper, 
because that is the terminology used by players and this is in accordance with our analysis approach. 
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[Character Blackboom Junklord, 20/04/2009, Post #23077824] (text in square brackets added) 
 
We clearly see the humanitarian focus of this message contrasting with the proposal to greatly 
reduce the achievements. Punishment, says this player, should be reasonable so people can realize 
their mistakes and change how they behave. Punishments which are too harsh do not allow the 
redemption of cheaters. 
 
A further forward looking punishment is the proposal to make the deletion warning permanent 
rather than lasting just 6 months. What are the advantages of this type of punishment according to 
players posting on forums? Clearly this punishment gives a second chance to wrong-doers, 
because someone will receive the 1 month ban, but after that he/she will have the opportunity to 
redeem him/herself and play fairly. Any further offence would lead to the deletion of the account: 
 
I suggest that criminal records made by bots should NOT be clean after 6 months, but stays 
forever, this way the owner of the account could have a second chance so he/she would know that 
if he/she try to cheat again he/she for sure will lost  his account.  
[Character Ephius, 12/05/2008, Post #18727821] 
 
This punishment is forward looking for another reason: 
 
if a botter gets banned for botting, he'll have normal deletion warning like it's now for 6 months & 
after it 'clean'  criminal list. With the slight difference that the account will have a everlasting 
deletion warning if it bots again. this way they can get rid of botting without losing their 
customers.  
[Character Hugragra, 02/04/2009, Post #22822967]  
 
According to players posting on the forums, the permanent warning solution is advantageous for 
Cipsoft who can tackle cheating without permanently losing customers and revenue. Again,  
Cipsoft moral enterprising actions and business interests can go together. 
 
24 
7. Punishment Reform and Its Outcomes 
On January 21 2010 a reform of the punishment for violating rule 3c and other offences (such as 
sharing an account) was announced by Cipsoft (2010b) with an article, entitled Anti-Cheating 
Measures Reloaded: 
 
Permanent final warnings 
From now on, there will be permanent punishments for all players who gained permanent 
advantages through the act of cheating which includes the use of unofficial software to play, 
account sharing and account trading. As many of you have requested in the past, every single 
account which is identified for having cheated will now get a permanent final warning that does 
not vanish any more after 6 months. Also, all accounts which currently have a final warning due to 
the use of unofficial software to play, account sharing or account trading will not lose this 
warning either. In case of any further rule violation that would lead to a banishment, accounts 
with a permanent final warning will be automatically deleted without any prior warning. 
 
The punishment reform – so strongly requested by the player community on the forums – took the 
form of a permanent final warning, following one of the many proposals by players. The final 
warning simply means that the deletion warning, given as a punishment (together with the 1 month 
ban), rather than just remaining for 6 months, will last forever. In this way any further violation of 
rules will lead to full deletion of the account. This of course implies that other players‟ proposals 
for punishment reform have not been implemented and in particular the instant deletion of cheaters 
accounts and the reduction of advantages obtained by botting. With the final warning, however, 
deletion of an account becomes the punishment for every second offence. This reform of the 
punishment system was warmly welcomed by many Tibia players posting on the forums as a step 
toward solving the botting problem: 
 
A step in the right direction. The permanent final warning is an awesome idea, the best way to 
prevent rule violations is to make the penalty harsh enough to outweigh the benefits of cheating 
[Character Dylen Lord of Chaos, 26/01/2010, Post #26324440] 
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In this message the final warning is presented as having a preventive power that outweighs the 
advantages of cheating. Interestingly, the permanent final warning also applied to accounts that 
were on temporary warning when the reform was introduced. This has been described by players 
as unfair and against the principle of Ex Post Facto Law: 
 
There is a very simple principle of criminal Law, as far as I know, common to all legal democratic 
systems: the Law may not retroact to harm, to jeopardize. The cheating was perfomed under some 
applicable rules. Only these rules should apply and not other rules created after the cheating.  
[Character, Dark Harlequin, 22/01/2010, Post #26275106] 
 
The new rules are applied retroactively to past behaviours (all accounts which currently have a 
final warning […] will not lose this warning either) and those with a 6 months temporary warning 
at the time when the reform was introduced received a permanent warning (see figure 1 for a 
description). For this forum poster (but others expressed this same concern on the forum), this 
contrasts with the „real world‟ legal principle that people can only be punished according to laws 
existing at the time when the rule violation was committed. There are different problems related 
with this.  
 
 
Figure 1. Permanent Warning Acting Retroactively 
 
First, we are in a situation in which someone is punished with different rules compared to those 
he/she was playing under when the rule violation occurred. Here a further analogy with „the real 
world‟ is made by a forum poster: 
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I don't mind ppl who get banned from now on get a permanent deletion warning but changing old 
deletion warnings in permanent one is like arresting a guy for theft, then once he's in jail already 
you change the rule for theft to lifetime penalty. People commit violations based on the 
assumptions they have about what the penalty would be. They cheated knowing what would be the 
penalty is  they did it, then after doing it, suddenly their penalty changed? That's just unjustice lol. 
[Character Camahimos, 21/01/2010, Post #26266204] 
 
 According to this player, people commit  rule violations by evaluating the cost/benefits in relation 
to penalties existing at the time of the wrong-doing. Although this assumption could be criticized 
as utilitarian, what this player is conveying is the idea that players may evaluate penalties before 
violating rules. In this case, the violation (i.e. using a bot) was committed with the 6 months 
warning as penalty, but afterwards the punishment became a permanent warning in a situation in 
which the new penalty could not be evaluated beforehand by rule violators. However, and 
secondly, this utilitarian attitude toward an evaluation of punishments is not accepted by everyone 
in the community: 
 
Although I loathe comparing rule enforcement in Tibia to real life criminal justice systems I will 
simply point out that in the case of a state changing minimum sentences for crimes, appeals can 
and are raised to ensure that previously convicted felons have their sentences reviewed to comply 
with the updated policy. As for logic, it seems quite logical that everyone who has been recently 
been punished for cheating is not given the chance to freely reap the benefits of their cheating 
simply because they have only now decided the costs outweigh the benefits. 
[Gamemaster Lycant, 22/01/2010, Post #26276564] 
 
Even if laws act retroactively this is justified for some players. Using a bot is a severe offence – in 
a game context – and it is acceptable therefore for many players that in an MMORPG “crimes” can 
be redefined and “criminals” can receive new punishments which are deemed proportional to their 
wrong doing. Finally, it is important to disclose that some players felt that the moral enterprise has 
the right to act as full dictator of the game and has therefore the right to change the rules to meet 
its need: 
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Anyone posting here has an account, which means they agreed to CIP's terms to be full dictators 
here. They preserve the right to delete/abuse/reset/do anything to your account at all times. 
[Character Elaynda, 26/01/2010, Post #26321198] 
 
In fact, says this player, when one creates an account and accepts the rules he/she also accepts that 
Cipsoft has the right to change the rules at its discretion. The Tibia Extended Service Agreement 
(Cipsoft, 2010c) clearly states that “CipSoft GmbH reserves the right to partially or completely 
modify this agreement at any time”. For this reason, the comparison with real law could be 
irrelevant for legal scholars, but it is not for players who seem to use the comparison between real 
and virtual law to persuade their peers about the unfairness of this decision. However, the legal 
documents legitimize Cipsoft's actions in this case. Even though having a law that applies 
retroactively does not seem fair, especially when compared to real life law, virtual worlds are 
different. In virtual worlds, authority (the game company) can exercise absolute power 
(Castronova, 2005) based on legal documents and control of the game code (Humpreys, 2008) and 
hence game companies are in a position to allow the “game law” to act retroactively whenever 
they want. 
 
Conclusion: Towards the design of appropriate 
Punishment Systems in Virtual Worlds 
Botting is a practice in online games which is expressly forbidden by EULAs and other 
documents, documents which are called „legal‟ and serve to „govern‟ the relationship between 
players and the game. This paper is grounded in a sociological analysis of player practices and 
discourses surrounding the use of bots and the development of appropriate punishments for such 
rule violation in MMORPGs. We are concerned with explaining how, in these online worlds, rules 
and the enforcement of punishments for their violations emerge and change over time in response 
to deviant behaviours. We are interested in particular in exploring the guiding principles 
underlying punishment systems in MMORPGs.  
In our case study of Tibia we found a dialectic confrontation between Cipsoft and some Tibia 
players (those actively posting on the game forums) in relation to the issue of sufficient and 
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appropriate punishments for the use of bots in Tibia. The company‟s failure to sufficiently punish 
and deter a number of players from botting appeared to weaken the company's position and 
reputation as what Becker (1963) would call a „moral enterprise‟. However, there was a clear 
conflict for the company between being an economic enterprise with no desire to delete paying 
customers and the company role as moral enterprise focused on ensuring a fair service for all the 
players. In this case study certain players posted their critical comments on official and unofficial 
forums and threatened to withdraw payment in order to pressurise Cipsoft to reform the 
punishment system. In this way, players also acted as moral entrepreneurs for the game, 
suggesting alternative strategies and reforms to the punishment system and giving reasons for 
these proposed alternatives. Players posting on forums also expressed the idea that the company 
moral enterprising initiatives and business interests should go together. 
De Zwart (2009) has argued that there is often a lack of transparency regarding the values sought 
to be protected and promoted by the platform providers in MMORPGs. The guiding principle of 
Tibia‟s punishments for botting appears to be to maintain „fairness‟ in the game world while 
sustaining the game company‟s reputation and game revenues. However, the Tibia punishment 
system bans cheaters but does not attempt to rebalance the inequalities caused by rule violations 
(i.e. be retributive) and there is more interest, from the company point of view, with rehabilitating 
cheaters  as paying customers (i.e. be forward looking). This does not appear to be „fair‟ or „just‟ 
in the way that Humpreys (2008) has called for, especially for fair players who always behave 
according to the game rules.  
Indeed, for Beccaria (1764) a punishment, in order to be effective, requires the privation of the 
advantages obtained by violating the rules. Current punishments in most MMORPGs do not 
consider this option. Punishments, or penalties as they are often called in MMORPGs policy 
documents, are mostly based on external punishments such as bans (or suspensions) and deletion 
after multiple severe violations of rules (see for instance WoW
29
 or Eve Online
30
 among others). In 
Tibia, the exclusive use of mild external punishment was one of the sources of the failure of 
punishment. These external punishments are not retributive
31
 and do not directly affect what has 
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  http://www.wow-europe.com/en/policy/accountpenalties.html 
30
  http://www.eveonline.com/pnp/banning.asp 
31
  Except deletion which happens only after multiple severe violations and against the company‟s will to act inclusively. 
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been unfairly obtained (e.g. levels or gold) internally in the game world. In the case of Tibia we 
have seen how players often use analogies with the real world in order to describe how leaving 
unfair advantages with botters is unfair. While not all comparisons between behaviours in real and 
online environments are appropriate, affecting unfair advantages in-game should, and could, be a 
key aspect of anti-cheating actions, while retaining the unique aspects of the virtual space. Our 
recommendation for MMORPGs governance design is that developers and game builders should 
consider the ethical principles underpinning their punishment systems and aim to balance the 
offence caused by severe rules violation with respect for the consumer and personal rights of all 
game players.  
Our findings on the ethical implications of different punishment systems have relevance for the 
design of governance systems and information security in online worlds more generally (Braman 
and Malaby, 2006). In particular our approach counters the dominant approach to information 
security research for Virtual Worlds as contained in the current European Research Programme 
and publications by the European Network of Information Security Agency (ENISA). While a 
recent ENISA paper argues that game providers, should “create an appropriate balance between 
security measures aimed at detection and those aimed at prevention” (2008, p. 54) they focus only 
on technical security measures and do not consider the potential offered by social control, or a 
combination of social and technical measures, for either detection or prevention of cheating. Our 
work shows that there are options other than exclusively technical information security measures 
to counteract cheating in MMOPRGs. In our view there are many problems that technical security 
mechanisms do not solve or if they do solve them, they do so in a manner which is inappropriate in 
terms of the online context and require the player to surrender too much control. We argue 
therefore that information security research should more generally explore and foster the adoption 
of social mechanisms to prevent and counteract cheating and other security threats in Virtual 
Worlds.  
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